INTRODUCTION
In 1894, John Drinkwater, the befuddled, searching architect in John Crowley's compelling fantasy, Little, Big, built his own home, Edgewood, "as a kind of compound illustration" of Victorian architectural styles.
1 Rounding each corner, the visitor sees a different façade and interior -Italianate villa, Tudor manor house, neo-classical, country cottage -complete in itself, its attachment to the others invisible from a single perspective.
Reading a small flurry of articles from the past few years attempting to describe the field of health law, 2 one feels like a visitor to Edgewood. The different perspectives are pleasing in themselves, without necessarily revealing the whole. This essay examines what I call the "architecture" of the health law field. By this I mean, without pressing the metaphor too far, the framework of beams and studs in which interior spaces can be designed, furnished and accessorized in different ways.
This essay addresses three primary questions. First, what is an academic field of law? Second, is health law such a field? Lastly, if it is, how can or should it be portrayed? The first question may have no answer. There are no hard and fast rules for constituting an academic field of law, as explained below in Part IV. Scholars, like practicing lawyers, fashion their own spheres of expertise in response to practical need. This means that health law can qualify as a distinct field of law for several different reasons, summarized in Part V. Therefore, I begin with the third question. After describing the challenges of doing so, I suggest a conceptual framework for describing the field. It is not a theory, nor a set of normative standards, but a descriptionan architecture, if you will. The framework offers a blueprint for identifying the principles worthy of consideration in identifying and analyzing legal issues affecting health, while also allowing room for debating the normative values that might govern particular sub-specialities or doctrines.
I. DESCRIBING HEALTH LAW: THE CHALLENGES
Viewing the health law field as a whole, and as separate from other fields of law, encounters two major challenges: (1) the range of legal issues the field covers; and (2) the fact that many doctrines formerly unique to medicine have given way to more general principles from other legal domains.
The first challenge is surely the sheer breadth of doctrines that potentially apply to health issues. These include aspects of administrative, antitrust, constitutional, contract, corporate, criminal, environmental, food and drug, intellectual property, insurance, international, labor/employment, property, taxation, and tort law. At first, it may seem impossible to master all the law that could be relevant to health issues. Judge Frank Easterbrook's concern about dilettantism has some bite here.
3 Lawyers who know too little about the fields they try to join together -especially non-legal fields -risk errors of fact or judgment. The concern is that familiarity with only small segments of another field can deteriorate into doctrinal dabbling, distorting more general principles. But this may say less about the legitimacy of the health law field than the degree of difficulty in mastering it. One cannot profess expertise in health law without a solid grounding in the principles that are brought to bear on health issues, and their underlying rationales.
A possible response to the breadth problem is the practice of subspecialization, whereby scholars and practicing lawyers become familiar with the scope of the field, but develop expertise in a particular area. This is already common practice not only in health law, but also in other more traditional legal domains, such as constitutional law, where experts on the First Amendment may profess little knowledge of the negative commerce clause. Thus, the breadth problem is not necessarily an impediment to classification as an independent field of law.
The second challenge in describing the boundaries of health law is that the doctrines and principles grounded in other legal domains have come to apply to health problems with less and less special adaptation to the particular circumstances of the medical profession or the physician-patient relationship.
4 Doctrines look less like unique rules for health than relatively straightforward applications of principles of contract, tort, administrative law, 3 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 207, 207-08 (1996) (mocking "law and . . ." courses dedicated to a particular subject matter as dilettantism, analogous to "Law of the Horse."). Rev. 71, 76 (2008) (arguing that "a new field of legal study is justified when a discrete factual setting generates the need for distinctive legal solutions.").
or insurance, for example. This dilution of special rules followed health law's transformation from a narrow field of medical jurisprudence to the broader field encompassing professional, financial and civic relationships among patients, government, health providers, and financing institutions. The most obvious example is the doctrine of informed consent, which applies principles of autonomy and self-determination to decisions about medical treatment and recognizes that physicians have no special prerogative to make these decisions for their patients.
5 George Annas and other health law scholars have advocated for patients' rights to make their own decisions about medical care, to be treated with dignity and in privacy in hospitals, and to have access to medical records of their treatment, among other rights individuals enjoy outside medical facilities.
6
Judicial and statutory recognition of patient rights was not only a victory for patients' rights advocates, but also a response to changes in the science and practice of medicine. 7 Other sets of rules once thought foreign to the medical profession, such as antitrust law, began to govern physicians and health care organizations in more or less the same manner that they applied to commercial businesses.
8 Tort, contract and insurance principles are also increasingly brought to bear on health-related relationships with little alteration from their commercial origins.
9 To be sure, many of these principles and doctrines are modified somewhat to suit the particular circumstances of health problems.
10 Nonetheless, what is striking about health law doctrines today is how much less they diverge from the standards imported directly from other legal domains than they did a half-century ago.
Paradoxically, as health law gained acceptance as a distinct specialty, the legal principles governing much of its subject matter loosened their parochial ties to medicine as the rationale for singular rules. The convergence of principles and doctrines as applied in the health law field with the principles and doctrines as applied in their fields of origin poses a dilemma for defining the boundaries of health law. On one hand, this convergence can be seen as welcome recognition of particular needs of patients, professionals or organizations in the health field. On the other hand, to the extent that principles are not distinctive, there may be less justification for claiming a unique field of health law. 
II. DESCRIBING THE ARCHITECTURE OF HEALTH LAW
Despite these challenges, the persistence and growth of health law as a de facto legal specialty still argues for its acceptance as a field of law. This is not to say that health law unequivocally meets the definition of a field of law; rather, as I describe in Part IV, there is no authoritative definition that must be met. Health law qualifies because people practice it, and there is little to gain by academic debates over whether what they do is a field or not. Furthermore, as I argue in Part V, the absence of an overarching theory of health law is no impediment to becoming a field of law.
Nevertheless, if health law is a field, one should know what it includes. Ideally, health law should be described in a manner that gathers all the disparate legal doctrines into a comprehensible whole with observable commonalities, but without necessarily forcing it to adopt any normative goal. This requires accepting the applied nature of the field. The subject matter to which the law applies retains its singular importance. The reason we struggle with definitions is that what brings the different legal domains into play is the subject matter -health. As the Task Force on Health Law Curricula noted, "a description of health law cannot be viewed as merely the sum of its component bodies of law . . . . The content of health law emerges only in the application of these various bodies of law to the domain of the health professions."
11 Today, I would replace "the domain of the health professions" with "social structures that affect health."
Health is the subject of law, but it is not the goal of law. Most fundamentally, health law adopts and adapts principles from other legal domains to protect the value of health within a framework of justice and the rule of law. Thus, it is not simply the rote application of contract doctrine to an agreement between entities that happen to be in the health field, but an interpretation of whether and how that doctrine ought to be modified both to achieve the goal of contract law and to recognize the value of health. In this very broad sense, health law has dual normative goals: justice and protection of health.
The sense in which I use the concept of goals here is not to impose a requirement that the law must achieve specific normative ends. Rather, it recognizes that justice or the rule of law has its own goals and values. 12 In one sense, most applied fields have dual goals. The difference between health law and "law and the horse" is that the latter need not ascribe any particular value to the horse, whereas health law does value health, but not as a sole end in itself. This type of goal works best, and perhaps only works where it expresses a very broad and highly abstract value, like keeping promises or protecting health. Imposed on more granular circumstances, a value becomes outcome determinative and often counterproductive.
13 A value-driven legal structure The value of health is an essential consideration, but not necessarily controlling in any particular setting or circumstance. Lawyers need to think carefully about when a legal principle is controlling and when the health concern is controlling. It is one thing to contextualize the application of legal principles in specific circumstances.
14 It is quite another to subordinate general legal principles to the possibly self-interested goals of a particular industry or profession, no matter how congenial. This in no way precludes adapting principles to account for special obligations owed by physicians to patients by reason of a person's status as a patient and the physician's status as physician, for example. But that informs doctrinal development. It should not impose an overarching goal for law itself, not even in the health law field.
At the same time, it is not enough to apply existing bodies of law to health issues. The very attempt at application challenges the meaning of the principles being applied. 15 Recognizing the consequences of legal principles in the health context yields important insights into how we think about the relationship between individuals and government, as well as individual and social responsibility for health risks. 16 Health law analyses are transforming the way we think about the body, personal information, and property. 17 The interpretation of some laws related to health can affect the distribution of wealth and the allocation of resources. The application of health law principles has blurred the lines between medicine and public health, disease and health, and what it means to be a citizen, a consumer and a patient.
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These and countless other applications reveal the importance of both law and health and the iterative process of interpreting their mutual influence.
International law has already developed a conceptual framework for an architecture of the health law field in terms that recognize both the value of justice and the value of health. Looking at international conceptions of a field has the advantage of permitting comparative analysis of particular problems and laws across jurisdictional boundaries. It offers a common language for communicating with scholars and lawyers in other countries. In today's world, health is a global issue, and laws affecting health reach across national boundaries in many ways. 19 For this reason alone, awareness of the treatment of health in international covenants and documents may become an important part of teaching and practice.
One need not have any interest in international or comparative law, however, to recognize parallels between laws governing health and health care in the United States and the conceptual framework for rights and obligations used in international covenants.
The international language commonly used to discuss laws concerning health and health care was inspired by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations Economic and Social Council Dec. 12, 1948) , available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. The International Bill of Rights consists of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, id., the ICESCR, supra note 20, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 (1966) , available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm. Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control." Other articles specify related rights and the universality of all the rights described in the Declaration. For example, Article 1 states: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Article 2 states: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." Article 5 states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Article 9 states: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." Article 12 states: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation." The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra. right to be healthy," something no one can guarantee. 22 Rather, the Committee describes steps that signatory States Parties are expected to take, subject to their respective resources and other constraints on feasibility. Although the Committee contemplates that each country will adopt legislation or take other action to promote health, the precise nature of such actions remains subject to interpretation and, in practice, they are implemented differently and to varying degrees by each country. 24 States Parties must not interfere with personal freedoms, and they must provide, to the extent feasible, the care and protection necessary to protect the health of everyone in their populations. These obligations are described as the duty to "respect, protect, and fulfill" the right to health:
(1) respect individual human rights and personal freedoms; (2) protect people from harm from external sources or third parties; and (3) fulfill the health needs of the population. These three obligations provide an organizational structure for categorizing laws affecting health in any country. The parallels between types of law relevant to protecting individual rights, regulating private entities, and government provision or financing of services are striking, at least to this observer. 26 The table above illustrates how laws affecting health in the United States fall rather naturally into these categories. (The left hand column lists illustrative topic areas within the categories of respect, protection and fulfillment; the right hand column lists topics incorporated into Americans laws.) If we think about this structure architecturally, the three categories might represent three sections of the house, each with its particular framework.
Virtually all federal, state and local laws defining the rights and duties of private individuals and organizations, as well as those creating public programs and benefits, can be classified according to one of the three categories. Because the classification is based on the target of the law, some subjects can overlap categories.
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For example, in the international framework, prohibitions against certain forms of discrimination are found in both the first and second categories: the State has an obligation not to discriminate against individuals as part of its duty to respect the right to health and a further obligation to ensure that third parties do not discriminate as part of its duty to protect the right to health. This separation has the advantage of distinguishing between laws that assign responsibility directly to government and laws that impose obligations on private entities.
The duty to respect the right to health requires the State to "refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health." 28 This means that the State may not deny equal access to health services or health information, or initiate or enforce discriminatory practices. It also requires States to refrain from "applying coercive medical treatments," meaning that States must respect individuals' freedom to choose the type of care they receive and to refuse care they do not want. 29 The duty of respect can be best understood as a duty of noninterference with basic human rights like liberty, privacy, dignity and freedom from arbitrary discrimination in the health context, so that individuals are neither denied access to care nor treated unfairly within any health setting. Indeed, it is generally believed to confirm that such fundamental rights must be respected in the health context. Such respect often takes the form of positive law protecting specific rights, Comment 14 from the twenty-second session distinguishes the three obligations primarily in terms of whether the State or third parties are providing or interfering with access to health services. General Comment, supra note 22, Annex IV, at ¶ 33. For example, Comment 14 mentions an obligation to refrain from marketing unsafe drugs as part of the duty to respect the right to health and the similar duty to control the marketing of medical equipment and medicines by third parties as part of the duty to protect the right to health, thereby accounting for countries with either public or private systems. Id. at ¶ ¶ 34, 35. such as the right to informed consent to medical care. 30 In the United States, the duty of respect can be seen in laws forbidding interference with individual rights, such as laws requiring informed consent to medical care and research and prohibiting invasions of privacy and discrimination in access to care.
The obligation to protect requires affirmative action to ensure that third parties-essentially private entities -also do not interfere with the right to health. Where private parties provide goods and services, the State is expected regulate their activities by legislation, contract or other means. This includes ensuring that health professionals meet appropriate quality and competence standards, that food, medicines and health-related products are manufactured and marketed safely, and that industry does not pollute the water, air or soil.
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It also requires legislation or other action to prevent third parties from limiting access to care, such as family planning and pre-and post-natal care, as well as accurate health information. It is important to note, however, that the international framework does not prescribe any substantive or structural requirements for positive law. Apart from the general notion that laws should not imperil health or violate human rights, countries are free to develop many different approaches to protecting health.
United States laws that set health and safety standards fall easily within this category. They include professional and facility licensure laws, laws setting environmental standards, safety and health standards for workplaces, product standards and other laws intended to reduce health risks arising from products or the social or working environment. This is a broad category crossing a variety of legal fields, from administrative law to products liability. It includes anything that prevents the conduct of business in a way that could harm the health of patients, customers, workers or the general public. Sanitary standards for conducting businesses that can harbor and spread disease have existed since colonial times, applying to animal slaughtering operations, mortuaries, and milk pasteurization, for example. 32 More modern examples include standards for clinical and research facilities, standards for manufacturing food, drugs, medical devices and cosmetics, and even inspecting restaurants. Laws requiring licensure of health professionals, hospitals and other medical facilities are intended to ensure that those who are granted the privilege of providing care have at least a minimal level of competence and skill. Laws regulating health insurance set standards at least believed to promote access to care and prevent certain forms of discrimination. A huge number of national, state and local agencies, from the federal Food and Drug Administration to the local septic system inspection office, have been created to administer these regulatory systems. 33 The common law also provides standards intended to protect health, as found in negligence law, products liability and even contract and insurance law applicable to health insurance. This category might also include laws that prohibit the sale of illicit drugs like heroin and marijuana, or the sale of cigarettes and alcohol to minors, and laws that authorize the involuntary detention of people who are likely to transmit contagious diseases to others and people who are likely to harm others because of mental illness.
The obligation to fulfill requires countries to ensure that adequate health care is provided to the entire population, whether by public or private programs or a mixture of the two. 34 Recognizing the social determinants of health, it also requires that everyone have equal access to safe food and water, basic sanitation, and adequate housing and living conditions. Ensuring care also includes providing for appropriate training for medical professionals and ensuring that a sufficient supply of hospitals and other health facilities accessible is to everyone in the country. Assisting individuals to enjoy the right to health includes fostering research and disseminating information to the public. Satisfying these duties entails enacting legislation, adopting regulatory measures or providing funding to develop affirmative programs. 35 Here again, however, there is no substantive requirement for any particular approach. States may provide direct health services to all or some people in their countries, require third parties such as employers or insurers to pay for care, contract with third parties to offer care, or use a combination of approaches.
The duty to fulfill can be seen in American laws that affirmatively create benefit programs -offering health care, services or information that individuals are free to accept or refuse. This includes a vast array of public programs to purify the water supply, organize disaster relief, provide medical care such as Medicare and Medicaid as well as state programs for those without health insurance, and fund public and private health programs like family planning clinics, child nutrition programs, substance abuse treatment centers, and refugee care facilities. It also includes public support for biomedical research and public information programs. The number and type of laws creating government programs in the fulfillment category has risen dramatically since the mid-twentieth century.
Visualizing health laws as falling within these three categories has several virtues. First, it pays needed attention to the relationship between human health and respect for human rights. 36 It embraces both the value of justice and the value of health. The ICESCR recognizes, in Article 4, that in order to protect people in the enjoyment of the right to health, some limits on individual rights may be required, but "the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society." 37 This is intended to warn countries against using the right to health as a pretext for depriving 34 See General Comment, supra note 22, at ¶ 36. 35 See id. at ¶ 37. people of other human rights. 38 Any limitation on freedom must be justified by its genuine contribution to preserving other freedoms and entitlements. In this way, basic human rights provide a boundary constraint for the choices of positive law that are permitted to protect health and fulfill health needs. This constraint guards against allowing the value of health to override the rule of law.
Another advantage of this framework is that it includes all aspects of the health field: personal relationships, financial relationships, federal-state jurisdiction, contractual relationships, rights and responsibilities, and institutional structures. While health and healing may be the objectives of people who provide medical care and those who finance and regulate those services, there is much more to making health or healing possible. The range of social and environmental factors that affect health are often as or more important than medical care. 39 The field of health continues to expand as more is learned about what affects health, especially socioeconomic factors, such as the distribution of income and wealth, political inequality, education, employment, housing, and the environment (known as the social determinants of health), as well as individual genetics, travel and migration, and climate change.
40 Laws governing those factors should not be ignored. 41 If institutional licensure and antitrust are included because they affect the way health care is made available, occupational and environmental factors that may affect health should be considered as well. 42 They may solve problems that seem intractable when viewed as medical or health care problems alone. Adopting this broader vision is consistent with the history of health law, which has developed and expanded in response to advances in science and changes in the social institutions that affect health and medical care.
Finally, and most importantly, although the framework acknowledges the relevance of many different factors affecting health, it does not prescribe any particular legal structure or set of doctrines. The overall question is how to organize social institutions (including rights and duties) to protect health and treat illness without jeopardizing essential human rights like autonomy and dignity. Answers to this question will necessarily embody normative values.
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Id. at art. 5. 39 See generally Comm'n on Soc. Determinants of Health, World Health Org., Final Report: Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity through Action on the Social Determinants of Health (2008) But the framework does not answer the "how" question itself. Instead, it leaves each country free to analyze the merits of specific choices for positive laws in each category. It is here that more specific debates take place about the justifiable objectives of particular laws and the merits of particular means to achieve them, from employer mandates to compulsory immunization.
The international framework thus offers an architectural blueprint for constructing health laws. Figure A , depicted at the end of this article, offers a rough illustration. The obligation to respect can be seen as the foundation for two more stories, one protecting and the other fulfilling health needs. Laws protecting basic human rights, such as autonomy and privacy, frame the structure, creating boundary constraints as well as structural beams projecting through all the floors. Within each story are multiple rooms, furnished with relevant legal domains overlaying topic areas, as illustrated at the end of this article in Figure B . Debates over particular laws contribute to the discussion of how to furnish the rooms. Should government provide particular services directly, fund private entities to do so, require private organizations to provide services, or adopt some or all of these options? Which legal principles should govern? A few antiques may fit some rooms perfectly, while new pieces may be required in others. Some bits of furniture may need reupholstering to suit the room. The iterative process of adapting doctrine to suit the circumstances continues here.
This vision of health law is less eccentric than the house of Edgewood, with its idiosyncratic, mismatched sections. The international framework offers an integrated, external architecture for housing the field of health law. In contrast to Edgewood, health law's idiosyncrasies are inside, in the rich variation of its interior spaces. There is even room for considering international and comparative law. Importantly, by consolidating all types of law that affect health, it reminds us that there are many ways to solve health problems and that we should consider all the alternatives before automatically adopting a particular approach.
III. WHAT IS A FIELD OF LAW ANYWAY?
The foregoing description explicitly recognizes, as do most observers, that health law is an applied field. 43 To many, this confers an advantage and a rich opportunity to consolidate legal education in a way that mirrors actual practice.
44 Some academic traditionalists, however, would not count an applied field as a "field of law." 45 This begs the question of why other generally accepted areas of study or practice should qualify as fields of law. By what standards and criteria, and for what purpose, is any particular area thought to qualify as a substantive field? 46 This question turns out to be quite difficult to 43 White Dwarf, supra note 2, at 552-3; Sandbar, supra note 2, at 6.
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White Dwarf, supra note 2, at 567-8.
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Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 207-08.
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Almost all recent articles examining applied fields of law refer to Easterbrook's essay on cyberlaw. Id. See also Hall, supra note 2, at 355; Greely, supra note 2, at 404-05; Lessig, supra note 15, at 501. Easterbrook's essay itself did not offer a definition for a field of law, apart from referencing an admonition that "'Law and . . .' courses should be limited to subjects that could illuminate the entire law." Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 207.
answer. The literature is notable for the absence of an epistemology or meta theory for positively defining the essential characteristics of a "field of law." 47 One possible answer, which may be the most accurate, is that separate fields have become accepted as a matter of historical accident or practical need. If longevity counts, one might take note that Blackstone's Commentaries includes a chapter entitled "Of Offences Against the Public Health, and the Public Police or Economy," dealing primarily with plague. 48 Treatises on medical jurisprudence also date from the 19 th century, 49 including works by John Ordronaux, who taught on the law faculties of Boston University and Columbia University. 50 It might be argued that a field cannot be defined simply by the subject matter to which it applies. And yet many are defined in that manner, and they have ample precedent. Nineteenth century legal scholarship includes treatises on the law of highways, 51 the law of railways, 52 the law of telegraphs, 53 and the law of building associations, which may be an ancestor of banking and mutual insurance law. 54 Legal texts summarizing the law in 18 th and 19 th century America contain somewhat different lists of fields of law (sometimes called subjects or 47 divisions) than their later counterparts. Nonetheless, many are described by the subjects to which the law described applies.
In his 1868 text summarizing law, Joel Prentiss Bishop remarked, "the first thing to be noticed is, that the subjects run into and include one another." 55 For example, the law of evidence, although a recognized division in the law, pertained to the law of contracts, real property, personal property, torts, public wrongs, international public and private law, "and all the rest." 56 Bishop argued that discussions "aimed at ascertaining what is the true scientific division of the legal field . . . are like the endeavors to find the philosopher's stone, to square the circle . . . endeavors after what, in the nature of things, cannot be performed, because the thing itself does not exist." 57 Many accepted fields of law exhibited blurred boundaries. Separate areas, such as the law of easements, the law of mortgages, the law of executory devises, and the law of estates eventually coalesced into the more general law of real property, while also touching on the law of contracts.
58 Each area has a feathering edge where overlap is inevitable. Prosser might have expressed the difficulty of setting firm boundaries when he wrote: "tort is a field which pervades the entire law, and is so interlocked at every point with property, contract and other accepted classifications that . . . the categories are quite arbitrary and there is no virtue in them."
59 Yet, Prosser also developed a separate field of agency.
60 Legal fields arise and fade away, expand and contract according to the problems and possibilities of contemporary society and commerce. So, the law of bills and notes has been overtaken by commercial transactions, which itself can be viewed as an aspect of contracts.
This phenomenon of running together yet remaining apart continues today. Compare the curriculum of almost any law school in 1950 with today's curriculum. Only a small proportion of subjects remain the same in name and content. Family law, for example, has absorbed the older law of marriage, with its reliance on distinctions between public and private spheres of responsibility, yet also feathers into principles of contract, tort, wills and trusts. Property law has borrowed from real and personal property. Subjects that today seem commonplace, like securities law and insurance law, would have surprised our ancestors, while others to which they paid studious attention, like admiralty, restitution, or maritime law, have a narrower audience. New fields arise and gain acceptance despite their initial strangeness. In 1868, Bishop encouraged his readers to study the U.S. Constitution because, "Here is a new field." Some areas acquire their distinctiveness, despite belonging to a larger conceptual sphere. Intellectual property has carved out a specialty area within property law. But for practical experience, antitrust law might be an aspect of contracts. For that matter, many fields of law might be brought under the Bishop's refreshingly honest appraisal of the difficulty of separating one field from another did not dissuade him from recognizing divisions: "Still, as a matter of practical convenience, we may divide off the legal field in various ways, as may best suit the particular purpose of the division, or our tastes."
62 It thus appears that the division of legal principles into fields of law remains a function of the purpose for which division is useful. Or perhaps it's just a matter of taste.
Most treatises describing fields of law make no effort to define fields according to any independent criteria. Nonetheless, one can discern three possible approaches to defining a discrete field. The first is by subject matter, taking the history and tradition of rules and customs associated with a particular subject, like maritime trade and the sea. 63 The second centers on a statute or set of related documents.
64 A growing number of fields fall into this second category, including trademark, administrative, bankruptcy, tax, and environmental law, as well as constitutional law and international public law. The third, and apparently smallest category, is defined by the overall purpose of the laws associated with the field. Here, contract law may be the best example. As defined in Corbin's treatise, the purpose of contract law is "the realization of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the making of a promise."
65 One might expect that a similar purpose could be stated for other traditional and enduring fields, but legal goals are not easily found or stated.
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Fields of law appear to have grown up according to quite different principles of organization, principles that are neither mutually exclusive nor internally consistent. While some gather a variety of legal principles around a focal subject, others concentrate on a document that inspires interpretation. Some, like conflicts and evidence, seem more procedural than substantive. Surprisingly few are grounded in goals, conceptual principles or themes independent of the subject matter to which they apply. These may include 61 An analogy might be the specialty (and department) of medicine in medical schools, which includes many subspecialties, including cardiology, pulmonology, oncology, infectious diseases, and many others. conflict of laws, contracts, criminal law, property, and torts, although property and torts admittedly feather out into the cornucopia of other legal fields, too.
The lesson here is that no ultimate authority exists for defining a field of law. Defining a field by the subject matter around which legal principles are gathered has as credible a pedigree as any other approach. Complaints that "law and …" fields are necessarily illegitimate overstate the case. In the absence of any compelling argument for adherence to rigid boundaries, a field may be defined by its own practitioners for their purposes or tastes. The test of its validity lies in whether others accept it.
IV. ACCEPTING HEALTH LAW
The world of practicing lawyers has definitely accepted health law as a specialty. The public and private programs, activities, and businesses that finance, provide, and oversee health care account for more than 16 percent of the country's gross domestic product. 67 Expertise in laws governing the health sector is taken seriously for that reason alone. Today's law students are increasingly likely to encounter health law issues in their careers and certainly in their personal lives. The practice of law now includes substantial segments devoted to health-related issues. Moreover, the organizational structure of the practice of law has changed. 68 Larger firms offer specialty groups within a national general practice. The number of federal, state and local agencies involved with health-related issues increased dramatically in late 20 th century, and lawyers have been welcomed at those agencies, as well as at hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and advocacy organizations, to name only a few. Whatever one might think of the appropriate roles of graduate education and professional training, law schools need to train students for these careers. Rev. 355, 357-58 (2007) (reporting a shift from professional firms to large firms and organizations, both public and private, an increase in specialization and business representation among practicing lawyers, and "a very stark prestige hierarchy across fields of law.").
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White Dwarf, supra note 2, at 554.
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I confess to attempting the same thing when I began teaching health law. I initiated and chaired the Task Force on Health Law Curricula, which produced a report, "Health Law and Professional Education," for the American Society of Law and Medicine. Task Force, supra note 11. The Task Force was charged with developing not a theory, but an overview of the health law field, describing the objectives of teaching health law, and making recommendations for curriculum content. It was a practical report for faculty. However, it With so many lawyers teaching and practicing what they call health law, it is hard to assert that no such field exists. 72 Defining it more elegantly and succinctly than I have tried to do in Part III above is both appealing and challenging. 73 Definitions tend to fall into two general categories: (1) definitions or descriptions based on topics or policy goals; 74 and (2) normative theories about the goals of health law in whole or in part. 75 Textbooks for teaching and practical treatises and manuals often use the first category, dividing the subject matter into subcategories familiar to practicing lawyers: subjects, such as liability, financing, corporate regulation, and bioethics; and policy goals, such as quality, cost, access, and autonomy. Alternatively, they divide it into structural components, such as international, governmental, institutional, and individual.
The topic-oriented approach has left some observers hungry for common legal themes to unite the components into more than a collection of healthrelated problems.
76 Some academics wish to endow the field with the higher credibility that law faculties accord to scholarship addressing legal theory.
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The more ambitious souls have offered ideas toward constructing a theory of claimed, perhaps presumptuously, to present a conceptual model of health law as a working definition of the field, but cautioned that its report was highly preliminary and expected the field to evolve with the subject matter, as it indeed has. 71 commercial endeavors, and therefore whether professionals should be accorded different legal treatment by virtue of their calling alone.
89
Law and medicine, not to mention the care delivery and financing institutions, have evolved so significantly that professionalism alone cannot offer thematic consistency across the entire range of issues within health law. The rise of hospitals and other health facilities, health insurance, and government agencies to regulate facilities, research, pharmaceuticals, and everything in between encouraged viewing the field as an industry amenable to economic analysis. Academic and perhaps political disagreements over law and economics approaches can tag the debate with a tinge of partisanship.
These conceptions of health law offer important perspectives on particular legal principles, but most seem too broad or too narrow, too subject-driven or too value-laden, to constitute an overarching normative goal for the field as a whole. They also carry the risk of legal instrumentalism -forcing law to achieve the goals of non-legal fields, like banking, insurance, or medicine. 90 Law can sometimes be a means to an end, but law has its own ends which should never be forfeited.
91
For the most part, normative theories compete to resolve more specific issues within a field. 92 In this role, they sometimes reflect philosophical preferences for specific outcomes. It may be too much to expect any normative theory to embrace an entire field objectively. Certainly, no single theory has proved generally acceptable. This suggests that descriptions of the field should avoid normative stances.
Normative theories about health law have other disadvantages as a conceptual framework for a legal domain. Most normative theories limit their scope to medical care, typically excluding mental health, environmental health, public health, and social, economic and political conditions. Even thoughtful examinations that seek common themes across the spectrum of norms largely limit themselves to medical care and its financing. 93 Narrowing may be a practical necessity when organizing law school courses, but it fails to capture the growing interconnectedness of health issues today.
Mark Hall notes that one might regard health law "as an intellectual field defined more by method than by substance -that method being some version of comparative institutional analysis." 94 But, as he also correctly recognizes, comparing different theoretical approaches to analyzing an issue is a 89 Today's house of health law accommodates an equally eclectic collection of scholars and practicing lawyers and promises many generations to come. Yet, unlike Edgewood, our home has changed, growing much larger and creating an increasingly cohesive external architecture from the values of justice and health. Inside, many different styles are still welcome. 
